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What impact does clientelism have on democratic performance and the realisation of social policy 
goals? The crux of the evaluative dilemma is that — however much clientelism diverges from the 
Weberian ideal of impartial, rule-based bureaucracy, or is associated with pathologies such as 
corruption — clientelistic practices can sometimes deliver material improvement to those in need, as 
well as providing a mechanism of elite-society accountability. The essays in Clientelism, Social 
Policy, and the Quality of Democracy provide a broad and varied set of responses to the question. 
This diversity is both a strength and a weakness.  
 
The book is divided into two parts. The first six substantive chapters provide studies of clientelism in 
Latin American states, covering Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. The second part 
broadens out from this regional focus to survey clientelism elsewhere, including India, Japan, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to geographical 
variety, the chapters display a range of methodologies, data sources, and policy areas, with some 
presenting original research and others providing literature reviews.  
 
This review will pay particular attention to the chapter by Linda Cook on Eastern Europe. Cook begins 
by arguing that ‘[e]xperiences with political clientelism in Eastern Europe’s post communist states 
differ from those of the other regions discussed in this volume’ (204). Nevertheless, Cook argues 
that we can divide Eastern European post-communist states into three groups according to the 
prevalence of clientelistic practices: the ‘poor, monoindustrial, rural and isolated’ parts of the former 
Soviet Union and Southeastern Europe (high clientelism); ‘consolidated East Central European 
democracies’ (low clientelism); and ‘post-Soviet electoral-authoritarian regimes’ (non-clientelistic 
electoral manipulation) (204-205). Cook argues that these groupings are the result of ‘the 
intersection of structural factors, primarily levels of socioeconomic development, and institutional 
factors, specifically levels of market transition, democratization, and political competition’ (207). 
Overall, the chapter provides a compact overview from a respected scholar of a group of states that 
— despite sharing the post-communist label — display increasing diversity.  
 
There are, however, a small number of weaker points in Cook’s chapter. Firstly, although the 
narrative exposition of the argument is clear, its summary in table 9.2 (207) serves to confuse rather 
than clarify, given the use of inconsistent categories. Secondly, rather than survey all electoral 
authoritarian regimes, Cook suggests that ‘the Russian Federation is the most important and will 
serve as a representative case of this type of political system’ (216). Although the focus on a 
particular case is understandable given the constraints of a short review, the claim that the Russian 
experience is ‘representative’ is less sound. The variety of types and levels of electoral manipulation 
across the former Soviet Union should caution against thinking in terms of the modal case — a point 
hinted at by the spread of Freedom House scores cited by Cook in table 9.1 (206) for Belarus, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Finally, there is a tension between the confidence with which Cook asserts that 
electoral manipulation is non-clientelistic in Russia and her acknowledgment of evidence to the 
contrary — evidence that chimes with recent findings, such as Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi’s (2014: 
Abstract) conclusion that ‘clientelist exchange can thrive in industrial settings and in the absence of 
deeply embedded political parties’.  
 
One of the book’s stated goals — and what would seem to set it apart from works such as Herbert 
Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson’s 2007 edited volume, Patrons, Clients, and Policies — is to ‘learn[] 
from successful experiences and develop[] a set of best practices for possible reform and change’ 
(xi). In order to explore the comparative impact of clientelism, a basic starting point would seem to 
be a shared definition of what, in fact, constitutes clientelism. The authors do not, however, share 
such a common understanding. Although this definitional plurality is not a distinctive feature of the 
book — it reflects differences in the wider, burgeoning literature1 — and although it allows for an 
interesting survey of different approaches, it severely complicates the task of meaningful cross-
regional comparison. This could have been remedied somewhat by more explicit referencing 
between chapters to note the implications of using different definitions of clientelism. Alternatively, 
this synthesising work could have been included in a substantial concluding chapter. Instead, the 
                                                 
1On the ‘lack of conceptual clarity’ in the literature, see Hicken (2011: 290).  
  
final, very short chapter by Beatriz Magaloni largely steers clear of discussing the findings of earlier 
chapters.  
 
In sum, the strength of Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy lies in the sheer 
variety of responses to the opening question. The book’s weakness lies in the lack of clarity regarding 
to what extent this diversity is a function of divergent experiences on the ground or simply differences 
in how we conceptualise clientelistic practices.  
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